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Abstract 
The application of multi-level modeling approaches to enterprise systems modeling can support leadership decision making for 
transformation of defense department operations.  In particular, this paper presents a framework for modeling enterprise 
transformation applied to complex analysis of defense in an era of technology globalization.  Large-scale public-private 
enterprises can generally be described as complex adaptive systems.  Multi-level modeling of complex adaptive systems is 
considered as an approach to inform leadership of actions and consequences of decisions addressing transformative change.  An 
example is elaborated for the domain of secure defense communications.  A framework for modeling the secure communications 
enterprise presents an interesting case for exploration of both multi-level modeling approaches and potential policy guidance at a 
global level.  Finally, the use of these types of models to enable policy exploration is illustrated for the particular case of 
counterfeit parts in the supply chain of military communication systems.   
 
The paper concludes with recommendations for further work in validating the modeling approach and application of the approach 
to a sample policy flight simulator representing counterfeit parts policy in military systems. 
 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Georgia Institute of Technology. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents a research framework for the study of complex adaptive systems with respect to large global 
enterprises.  In a broad sense, the research conducted a strategic study of the relationship between national security 
goals and the continuing globalization of source technologies critical to national security.  The desired outcome is a 
framework for analysis of global technology policy in the context of the complex economic and security systems 
that affect our world.  The focus of our study was to look at the problem as a complex system that could be modeled 
using new techniques targeted at understanding large complex adaptive enterprises. 
2. Background and Context 
In the wake of 9/11, Kenneth Juster, US Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration, stated that 
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“we all should now appreciate that globalization involves much more than an increase in economic activities 
throughout the world. Globalization also involves the integration – or, at times, the collision – of political, social, 
and cultural activities and values.”[1] The US exists today in a global economy, and US future growth and 
leadership depend on a strong global economy.  However, we cannot ignore the relationship between our economic 
power and the defense of our nation.  Current US policy does not necessarily recognize the complex relationships 
between economic and military power, to include diminishing US leadership in technology and innovation, greater 
dependence on global supply chains, and increasing risk to our critical infrastructure.  On April 8, 2011, the 
Woodrow Wilson Center released a paper entitled “A National Strategic Narrative.”[2] In short, this narrative 
proposes that we “must sustain our enduring national interests – prosperity and security – within a ‘strategic 
ecosystem,’ at home and abroad” and furthermore “to achieve sustainable prosperity and security through the 
application of credible influence and strength…”  This is consistent with a number of recent economic studies that 
conclude the US must increase its position of influence in the global supply chain, invest in commercial innovation, 
and increase the number of jobs in the tradable sector of our economy.  These positions argue against protectionist 
and isolationist strategies in favor of policies that reflect global engagement, influence, and sustainment.  When 
applied to such areas of interest as government acquisition policy, military operational missions, and continued 
globalization of military relevant technology, one must now consider decisions in a larger context of a global 
technology ecosystem. 
 
There is a need for systems engineering analysis frameworks under which such policies can be analyzed with 
respect to the larger issue of continued future US economic growth within in a global economy.  What is needed are 
methods to evaluate specific actions, such as assured supply chain policies or a critical technology agenda or a 
foreign student retention agenda, against the bigger issues of national security and prosperity.  These are complex 
adaptive systems composed of independent agents with differing, and often conflicting, interests and priorities 
which cannot be commanded and controlled.  However, they can be influenced to operate as we desire with the right 
mix of incentives and inhibitions (laws, regulations, etc.).  The research objectives of this paper focused on two 
objectives for further work: 1) identification of a model-based analysis framework that would apply to broad issues 
of globalization and national security, and 2) identification of a relevant problem and set of scenarios to evaluate the 
analysis framework.  An initial analysis framework that derived from previous research in multi-level modeling of 
complex socio-technical systems was selected and investigated for application in this space.  The application of such 
an analysis framework to the area of secure communications became the initial analysis candidate as there is a 
significant convergence of military and commercial technologies happening in this space at the present time.  
3. Multi-Level Modeling of Complex Socio-Technical Systems 
It is difficult to transform a large enterprise. The transformation of large-scale public-private enterprises such as 
the military-industrial defense complex is particularly difficult.  This enterprise is composed of large numbers of 
smaller enterprises that often have conflicting interests and priorities.  Further, there is no one really in charge, so 
these many smaller enterprises cannot be commanded or controlled to do anything.  The many agencies and 
companies within the defense enterprise have structures, processes, and investments – their business models – that 
have all been premised on the overall socio-technical system operating as it has been since they made these 
commitments.  Fundamental changes of this system could obsolete many of these investments, putting people out of 
work and hurting shareholders.  It is not surprising that agencies and companies oppose such changes. 
 
If the Department of Defense were to stop buying military aircraft, for example, and instead lease them by the 
hour, the business models of defense contractors would be significantly disrupted.  Who, for instance, would put up 
the capital to produce the airplanes in the first place? Who would provide insurance for weapon systems that are 
quite likely to be destroyed?  In general, who would take the risks that defense companies have never had to take?  
Not surprisingly, defense contractors would lobby against the “power by the hour” model.  These changes would 
disrupt their business models and probably marginalize many of their investments.  A stalemated political system 
would likely result.  This suggests a general principle. 
 
When considering transformation of a public-private enterprise, first consider how changes being entertained will 
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affect benefits seen as entitlements, people’s incomes, and companies’ business models.  The more disruptions these 
changes will create, the greater the difficulty of proceeding and the lower the probability of success.  This suggests 
the need for mechanisms to explore the impacts of disruptions before deciding to deploy them. 
 
This report proceeds by first discussing the fundamental nature of large-scale public-private enterprises.  
Succinctly, they are complex adaptive systems.  Multi-level modeling of such systems is then considered.  An 
example is then elaborated for the defense communications enterprise.  Finally, the use of these types of models to 
enable policy flight simulators is illustrated.  These simulators enable stakeholders to explore the future before 
committing to it. 
3.1. Complex Adaptive Systems 
Many people think of systems in terms of exemplars ranging from vehicles (e.g., airplanes), to process plants 
(e.g., utilities), to infrastructure (e.g., airports), to enterprises (e.g., Wal-Mart).  They often think in terms of 
decomposing the overall problem of system performance and management into component elements (e.g., 
propulsion, suspension, electronics, etc.) and, subsequently recomposing the designed solution for each element into 
an overall system design.  This approach to hierarchical decomposition has worked well to provide us automobiles, 
highways, laptops, cell phones, and the ability to buy products from anywhere in the world at attractive prices.[3]  
Success, however, has depended on the ability to decompose and recompose the elements of the system and, of 
particular importance, the authority and resources to accomplish this work. 
 
Not all system design and management problems can be addressed this way.  One problem is that the 
decomposition may result in losing important information resulting from interactions among the phenomena of 
interest.  Another very fundamental problem is that there is no one “in charge,” with the authority and resources to 
pursue this work.  Complex adaptive systems represent a class of design and management problems that tend to have 
these limitations.  Complex adaptive systems can be defined in terms of their characteristics:[4] 
• They are nonlinear, dynamic and do not inherently reach fixed equilibrium points.  The resulting system 
behaviors may appear to be random or chaotic. 
• They are composed of independent agents whose behavior can be described as based on physical, 
psychological, or social rules, rather than being completely dictated by the dynamics of the system. 
• Agents' needs or desires, reflected in their rules, are not homogeneous and, therefore, their goals and 
behaviors are likely to conflict -- these conflicts or competitions tend to lead agents to adapt to each other's 
behaviors. 
• Agents are intelligent, learn as they experiment and gain experience, and change behaviors accordingly.  
Thus, overall systems behavior inherently changes over time. 
• Adaptation and learning tends to result in self-organizing and patterns of behavior that emerge rather than 
being designed into the system.  The nature of such emergent behaviors may range from valuable 
innovations to unfortunate accidents. 
• There is no single point(s) of control – systems behaviors are often unpredictable and uncontrollable, and 
no one is "in charge."  Consequently, the behaviors of complex adaptive systems usually can be influenced 
more than they can be controlled. 
 
There are important implications for transforming systems that have these characteristics.  One cannot, using any 
conventional means, command or force such systems to comply with behavioral and performance dictates.  The 
agents in such systems are sufficiently intelligent to game the system, find workarounds, and creatively identify 
ways to serve their own interests, e.g., their mandated or perceived entitlements.  Leaders of such systems cannot 
impose a vision of the transformed enterprise, they can only intervene in the systemic performance with beneficial 
change.  Finally, the decision makers generally will not know the outcomes of such intervention for months or years, 
requiring understanding of a range of possible futures, and ideally leading measures of real change.[5] 
 
Previous research by the authors identified the concept of policy flight simulators which can allow key 
stakeholders to “drive the future” before they commit to it.[6]  The concept has been successfully applied to 
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complex adaptive systems in the healthcare arena.[7]  The viability for a similar approach to the US defense 
enterprise was explored in the balance of this paper. 
3.2. Multi-Level Modeling 
To develop policy flight simulators, one needs to 
computationally model the functioning of the complex 
adaptive system of interest to enable decision makers, as 
well as other significant stakeholders, to explore the 
possibilities and implications of transforming these 
enterprise systems in fundamental ways.  The goal is to 
create organizational simulations that will serve as policy 
flight simulators for interactive exploration by teams of 
often disparate stakeholders who have inherent conflicts, 
but need and desire an agreed upon way forward.[8] 
 
Consider the architecture of public-private enterprises 
shown In Figure 1.[9,10]  The efficiencies that can be 
gained at the lowest level (work practices) are limited by 
nature of the next level (delivery operations).  Work can 
only be accomplished within the capacities provided by 
available processes.  Further, delivery organized around 
processes tends to result in much more efficient work 
practices than for functionally organized business operations. 
  
However, the efficiencies that can be gained from improved operations are limited by the nature of the level 
above, i.e., system structure.  Functional operations are often driven by organizations structured around these 
functions, e.g., manufacturing and service.  Each of these organizations may be a different business with 
independent economic objectives.  This may significantly hinder process-oriented thinking.  Potential efficiencies in 
system structure are limited by the ecosystem in which these organizations operate.  Market maturity, economic 
conditions, and government regulations will affect the capacities (processes) that businesses (organizations) are 
willing to invest in to enable work practices (people), whether these people be employees, customers, or 
constituencies in general. 
4. Example – Defense Communications 
In recent years we have seen a significant shift of government and military communication systems from 
generally military purposed systems to a converged network blending tactical military use, military and government 
infrastructure use, and general commercial use of like technologies.  Government users continue to realize sizable 
benefits in performance along with significant reductions in size, weight and volume by utilizing commercial 
technology innovation.  In addition, government-purposed and commercial information networks continue to 
converge, driven by commercial economies of scale.  As a result, technology from commercial smart phones is 
becoming more widely used in military tactical environments, and military information network connectivity is 
becoming more dependent on public/private partnerships offering shared bandwidth and infrastructure.  At the same 
time, issues with information network security and counterfeit technologies continue to be a concern and drive 
policy decisions.  Examples abound in the news: 
 
“Army sees smart phones playing important role,” Army Times, 12 Dec 2010. 
“Huawei’s opacity a colourful issue for US,” Financial Times, 19 April 2011. 
“Flood of fake Chinese parts in US military gear: report,” Reuters, 22 May 2012. 
 
A framework for modeling the secure communications enterprise presents an interesting case for exploration of 
Figure 1. Architecture of Public Private Enterprises
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both multi-level modeling approaches and potential policy guidance at a global level.  Enterprise issues as diverse as 
government acquisition policy, supply chain and global trade, military operations and tactics, service providers 
(government and industry), security policy, and technology innovation all play an important role.  In order to 
execute a successful transition from a primarily military developed secure communications enterprise to one that is 
fundamentally dependent on commercial innovation and support, it is important to understand near-term indications 
of policy success as well as potential long-term results.  This requires the models to have potential measures of 
interest tied to such issues as those above, and representative scenarios that may have strong enterprise impact.   
4.1. System Architecture 
The secure communications enterprise is a system, and thus has an architecture and structure that has been set by 
long-term market and policy decisions.  A high level architecture depiction is shown in Figure 2.  It is important to 
notice that the operators of the enterprise are no longer just tactical communications operators, but include a 
combination of tactical operators, commercial service providers, and other government agencies together in a 
“Global Information Grid.”   
  
Referring back to Figure 1 which comprises our basic enterprise architecture, we can now discuss details of the 
“components” of such architecture at each of the 4 levels:   
 
1. Domain Ecosystem (Society): Operations at this level include missions, operational policies, acquisition 
policies, export control policies, immigration policies, and educational policies, in combination with the defense 
and commercial industry markets for secure communications.  To have the necessary information and 
appropriate incentives/inhibitions, we need policy alignment across the above government agencies to assure a 
motivated industrial base (US and elsewhere), and necessary competencies to deploy and sustain secure 
communications. 
 
There are now two large enterprises making up the secure communications domain: commercial 
telecommunication (the global enterprise that provides products and services to all users) and defense 
telecommunications (the set of approved, procured, and managed products and services used by the entire 
defense enterprise).  Many defense telecommunications services are actually provided by the commercial 
telecommunications industry. 
Figure 2. Architecture of Today’s Secure Communications Enterprise 
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In addition, the military tactical communications systems, which are a closed set of communications specific to 
military operations, now rest on an infrastructure provided by a combination of commercial and defense 
providers.  The infrastructure is also provided by a combination of terrestrial, wireless, and satellite providers.  
Key domain drivers include the existing defense business enterprise, the military tactical enterprise, and the 
costs and efficiencies related to decision making using a shared versus dedicated infrastructure.  This in turn 
affects operational policies such as certification and accreditation of systems, as well as acquisition policies.  
Finally indirect factors must also be considered including strategic trade and regulatory guidance. 
 
2. System Structure (Organizations):  At this level we have user organizations, service provider organizations, 
device and network vendors, acquisition organizations, and education and training organizations.  To have the 
necessary processes, we need organizations that are motivated to invest in and operate the needed processes 
within the context of available information, incentives/inhibitions provided by the domain ecosystem, and 
organizations that will invest in and operate education and training processes.  The organizations involved 
include three sets of user/providers: commercial telecommunications enterprises, government defense users and 
service contractors, and military operators supported by organic government operations.   Within this set one 
must consider both commercial telecommunications vendors and defense electronics vendors, along with the 
government acquisition enterprise and numerous other participating government agencies.   
 
3. Delivery Operations (Processes):  At this level we have network infrastructure and service processes, 
acquisition processes (including technology development), and education and training processes.  To acquire, 
deploy, access, and utilize secure communications, we need processes for acquisition, deployment, 
infrastructure operations, and service provision; and education and training to create the knowledge and skills to 
enable these processes. 
 
Network infrastructure and service processes are shifting to a converged model around a general movement 
toward converged IP protocols. Process providers include a mix of providers, a mix of technologies, and those 
who develop the systems versus adopt, assess and certify them.  In this mix, acquisition processes, including 
technology development, must be considered.  Decision makers must include operational performance as well 
as technology decisions and economic decisions (commercial off-the-shelf, economies of scale). 
 
4. Work Practices (People):  At this level we have secure communications services, acquisition of devices and 
networks, utilization of devices and networks, and people with requisite knowledge and skills.  To have secure 
communications, we need to acquire, deploy, access, and utilize appropriate devices, infrastructure and services.  
We also need people who can design, develop, operate, maintain – and use – these services. 
 
At this point the defense related operational concepts must be considered.  The model should separate “secure” 
and “communications.”  With a trend toward commercial communication systems adapted to “secure” services 
via hardware and software, one must consider appropriately normal, secure, and military classified levels.  This 
drives classes of work practices for communications and classes of work classes for secure to potentially be 
considered separately.  People might include users for defense mission; innovators, designers, developers; 
deployers of products and support; acquirers; certifiers and accreditors; and even users intending to disrupt 
defense missions. 
4.2. Operational Measures 
One of the benefits of a multi-level modeling approach is expression of key measures of value or outcomes at any 
level of the model.  We determined initially that four measures of the secure communications enterprise would have 
interest, all expressed in terms of probabilities of undesirable outcomes.  These are generally representative of 
measures that could be modeled in terms of missions or tactics, but by no means are a complete set.  The goal of 
these measures would be to assess outcomes that are relevant to the mission space (generally referred to as the 
system structure box in our enterprise architecture – Figure 1).  The selected measures are: 
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• Prob (Denied Acquisition) – US is denied access to a critical supply chain by a foreign entity 
• Prob (Failed Operations) – Operational user is denied access to secure communications due to 
compromised components of a system 
• Prob (Denied Operations) – Operational user is intentionally denied access to secure communications by an 
internal system attack 
• Prob (Intrusion) – Operational mission is compromised by adversaries’ having access to US secure 
communications 
4.3. Scenarios 
The evaluation of the framework is relevant to the assessment of specific problems or scenarios that can be 
evaluated in a modeling environment.  Four approaches to these problems were considered and are candidates for a 
more detailed analysis in future efforts. These provide good examples of the operational scenarios and measures 
relevant to a multi-level modeling approach. 
 
An open source 4G scenario provides a baseline assessment based on current emerging shifts in technology.  This 
scenario would postulate continuing movement toward and acceptance of a converged secure communications 
environment, driven by acceptance of current Fourth Generation (4G) Long-Term Evolution (LTE) cellular data 
standards for broadband data transfer by elements of the government and military.  This is an interesting baseline, 
first because it is upon us, and second because the 4G (LTE) standard is not considered US innovation and generally 
is dominated by non-US companies (primarily Ericksson and Huawei).     
 
The second scenario postulates a major investment in developing a US-owned source of fifth generation 
communications devices.  This scenario is interesting in that it would exercise decision factors such as US targeted 
investment in innovation and manufacturing, the behavior of the current global innovation and manufacturing 
industry base that would be part of such investment, and perhaps the value of some military unique requirements 
that could be placed into the intellectual property (much as the deployed Global Positioning System has today).   
 
The third scenario accepts the risks of the imported devices but adds software applications to counter these risks.  
It would emphasize the role of the innovator in our potential investment models, as well as opportunities for 
expanded security policy.  It is also interesting in that it proposes a “fast follower” economic approach, allowing US 
secondary use of the infrastructure technologies but leadership in the “secure” part of the communications 
enterprise. 
 
The fourth scenario we refer to as spectrum hopping and it was added as a particularly disruptive potential 
innovation scenario that could impact the secure communications enterprise independently from the other scenarios 
listed.  This scenario postulates that spectrum use and management, traditionally prioritized for military and 
emergency use, came into full competition with commercial enterprise.  This is a realistic scenario in that current 
commercial wireless technology is moving toward spectrum hopping or sharing technologies as a matter of 
efficiency and cost, where previously most such technologies were the domain of military system only.  The 
potential for spectrum denied operations – one aspect of the “Prob (Denied Operations)” metric – is of great 
concern. 
4.4. Defense Communications Enterprise Model 
Figure 3 presents a high-level model of the defense communications enterprise. 
  
Government Operations, including the Departments of Defense and State and the intelligence agencies, express 
needs in terms of performance, costs and time.  Government Acquisitions transforms these expressions of needs into 
requirements.  Note that Government Operations and Government Acquisitions must comply with relevant 
Government Policies. 
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Defense Contractors respond to the requirements developed by Government Acquisitions.  They are influenced 
by a range of Government Policies, including those for acquisition, intellectual property (IP), and immigration.  IP is 
of concern in terms of gaining and sustaining competitive advantage.  Immigration affects workforce availability, 
especially highly skilled semiconductor and communications engineers. 
 
Defense Contractors are also affected by Market Rules, where revenues and profits affect share prices, and 
investor sentiment in general.  Defense Contractors submit proposals for Development and Manufacturing.  This 
requires committing people, technology and money, for which the companies expect revenue, profits and 
competitive advantages that will enable success in terms of Market Rules.  Development and Manufacturing are 
particularly important for the 5G scenario, which assumes all activity happens in the United States. 
 
System Designers, using the resources provided and complying with a range of rules, develop new capabilities to 
deploy for providing communications services.  This is where security applications would be deployed in the Apps 
scenario.  Service Providers invest in Service Processes embodying these capabilities.  Service Providers are also 
subject to Government Policies and Market Rules.  However, the Market Rules are different than those for Defense 
Contractors because the vast majority of Service Providers’ business is conducted in the commercial sector of the 
marketplace.  They want to be able to exploit the technologies gained via defense in much larger commercial 
markets. 
 
Service Processes involve infrastructure and service rules operated by Service Workers.  This results in 
performance characteristics such as bandwidth, as well as reliability and maintainability results.  Service Processes 
support Communications Processes across a range of Government Operations, providing communications services 
to Communications Users.  This is where the SH scenario would play out.  The use of these services results in flows 
of communications content, which are subject to the four risks described earlier and shown in the upper right of 
Figure 3. 
4.5. Elaborating The Model 
The next step in developing this multi-level model is to represent the processes and variable flows in Figure 3 
using a range of computational models.  This will likely include: 
• A set of rule-based policy models for acquisition, intellectual property and immigration, indicating what 
Figure 3. Multi-Level Representation of Defense Communications Enterprise 
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should and should not be done in each policy area. 
• An acquisition model, likely a discrete-event representation of the consumption of time and money by a 
range of agent-based organizations. 
• Microeconomic models of defense contractors and communications service providers that represent the 
relationships of profits to revenue, variable costs and fixed costs, and include both price sensitivities and 
economies of scale. 
• An engineering development model, perhaps in terms of a Work Breakdown Structure that consumes time 
and money and results in staging of deliverables. 
• A communications services model that predicts performance, reliability, maintainability, etc. for 
communications infrastructures operating under different rules. 
• A communications usage model that predicts demands for services, bandwidth required, and the nature of 
content flowing. 
• Models to predict four probabilities of interest – denied acquisition, failed operations, denied operations 
and intrusion.  These would include both supply chain models and security policy models, as well as 
models of military operations, missions, and tactics. 
• Models to predict cost of fielding, and time until fielding, for each of the four scenarios. 
• Visualization of results represented in terms of the probabilities of interest. 
5. Example – Multi-Level Modeling for Counterfeit Parts in Defense Supply Chains 
There is an immediate application to be explored which represents both a subset and generalization of our secure 
communications example – that of the problem of counterfeit electronic parts intruding into the supply chain of 
defense systems.  From an operational perspective, this example incorporates three of the four measures identified in 
our secure communications example: Prob (Failed Operations), Prob (Denied Operations), and Prob (Intrusion). 
 
Recent issues and attention on counterfeit parts have come to the forefront primarily the latter two measures 
presented above.  Counterfeit electronic parts have long been present in the supply chain of electronic parts, 
motivated by the desires to increase profits in production and distribution networks that represent millions of 
commodity parts. The problem of counterfeit electronic parts is not new but has generally been associated with 
failure rates in systems which can be effectively evaluated with statistical models and parts quality programs in 
defense acquisition programs.  The idea that adversaries would use counterfeiting to intentionally disrupt or intrude 
on operational missions is a relatively new phenomenon and is driven by issues specific to today’s complex, global 
supply chains.  This has resulted in a call for increased policy direction in the procurement of military systems and 
increased vigilance in the military logistics enterprise, all of which have significant cost implications.  The question 
then is what policy?  Evaluation of the aspects of the complex adaptive system in this enterprise will defy traditional 
statistical models and potentially lead to policy decisions that may either unnecessarily add cost with little 
operational benefit or create unintended consequences such as driving commercial industry away from government 
procurement opportunities. 
 
The multi-level modeling framework that would be used to address these issues is nearly identical to the 
framework identified for secure communications.  This leads us to assume that many parts of such a model can be 
reused across multiple enterprises, specifically those that drive behaviors in the government policy, operational, and 
acquisition organizations as well as defense contractor organizations.  The central modeling questions we would 
pursue include framing the overall “system,” ranges of feasible interventions, ideal outcomes of policy decisions, 
tradeoffs between policy and technical solutions, and general approaches to model validation. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this effort we addressed a fundamental question: can we identify a framework for analysis of complex defense 
policy in an era of global technology diffusion and competition?  We identified a framework in enterprise modeling 
of complex adaptive systems, based on a body of previous research which has been applied successfully to the 
understanding of complex healthcare enterprises.  We identified a domain (secure communications) that would have 
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relevance to such an analysis, and an initial set of current issues, phenomena, and scenarios that could drive initial 
development of a “policy flight simulator” relevant to this domain.  This study indicates that it is possible to develop 
a multi-level modeling approach to address such issues, and that it would have utility to inform decision makers of 
policy, investment, and risk mitigation actions that would be difficult to otherwise understand using traditional 
system modeling techniques.  We identified a current defense related systemic issue, namely counterfeit parts, which 
could gain immediate benefits from the insight provided by these types of models. 
 
Follow-on research activities will be conducted under the Systems Engineering Research Center to further the 
state of the practice along two parallels.  The first is identification of relevant problem sets where complex adaptive 
systems persist and the actions of policy and decision makers would benefit from the additional insights gained from 
a holistic view of potential futures.  The second is further exploration and use of the techniques associated with 
multi-level modeling to aid the long term development of models that aid in development of more resilient systems 
and policies.   
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